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Abstract  
This paper takes a fresh look at three issues in the aid effectiveness debate.  First, we
assess the theoretical case for foreign aid.  Using an endogenous growth version of the
standard overlapping generations model, we show that aid can be an effective policy tool
in spurring growth in poor countries.  This model also furnishes a theoretical foundation
for the approach taken in many empirical studies.  Second, we demonstrate that 
cross-country data, which underpin traditional cross-section based conclusions about the 
aid-growth link, are fully consistent with the positive evidence on aid effectiveness that
emerge from recent panel-based regressions.  Third, we reexamine the case for 
policy-based conditionality.  Our empirical analysis suggests that aid is generally
effective, even in “bad” environments.  However, the degree to which aid enhances
growth depends on climate-related circumstances.  
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1. Introduction
The usefulness of foreign aid in promoting growth in developing countries has been
an area of controversy ever since Rosenstein-Rodan in 1943 advocated in favor
of aid to Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. However, the last few years have
witnessed a gradually forming consensus view that aid works. Indeed, panel-based
empirical studies have repeatedly concluded that foreign aid does impact positively
on growth. This encouraging conclusion has not yet caught the attention of the
academic and policymaking community. Instead, it has been overshadowed by a
parallel debate regarding “necessary conditions for aid eﬀectiveness”. In particular,
is “good” macroeconomic policy a prerequisite for a positive impact of aid on GDP
growth?1 Technical issues about the choice of functional forms and econometric
technique have been at the core of specialist disputes. Meanwhile a sense of “aid-
fatigue” has spread. Browsing through successive editions of leading textbooks in
development economics provides telling illustrations of how the confidence of our
profession in the eﬀectiveness of foreign aid has dwindled. In the first edition of
“Leading Issues in Economic Development”, Meier (1964) dedicated a full 18-page
section to the issue of foreign aid. He started out asking: “How much aid?”. By
the time of the sixth edition (Meier, 1995), the treatment of foreign aid had been
cut into half, and the questions in focus were “Why oﬃcial assistance?” and “Does
aid work?”. In the 2000 edition (Meier and Rauch, 2000), “foreign aid” is not even
listed in the index.
As far as we can tell, skepticism about the validity of recent empirical findings is
fuelled by two important considerations.
First, the theoretical foundation for trusting in aid as a growth enhancing factor
is spongy. Generation after generation of students have grown up with Meier’s
textbook, simple aggregate models such as the Harrod-Domar model and growth
programming in the two-gap tradition. Yet, the bulk of this kind of work is by
now rather dated, and several theoretical treatments of recent date suggest that
the eﬀectiveness of aid is doubtful (Boone, 1996; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Obstfeld,
1999; Svensson, 2000). Moreover, the early aid-growth work was nested in a the-
oretical framework where savings behavior is exogenous. Thus, the fungibility of
aid whereby aid is “diverted” from investment to consumption is treated as an ex-
ogenous phenomenon. This makes analytical contributions based on this approach
vulnerable to the Lucas-critique, and it would appear that the credibility gap has
by now widened to canyon like dimensions. In Section 2, we therefore reexamine
the case for aid transfers in a theoretical framework where fungibility can arise
endogenously.
Second, taking a candid look at the data, it does appear that aid is not at all
1See Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dehn, 2001; Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Guilla-
mont and Chauvet, 2001; Hansen and Tarp, 2000, 2001; Hudson and Mosley, 2001; Lensink and
White, 2001 and Lu and Ram, 2001, among others.
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Figure 1: Real per capita GDP growth vs. the Aid to GDP ratio. Data are annual
averages over the period 1979-1998 for 114 counties. Source: World Development
Indicators 2001.
eﬀective, and the aid eﬀectiveness debate abounds with correlations such as those
in Figure 1 and 2. Figure 1, in particular, has repeatedly been used to illustrate
the weak nature of the relationship between aid and growth (from Griﬃn, 1970 to
the World Bank, 1998). To be sure, the older cross-country empirical literature,
surveyed in White (1992) and Hansen and Tarp (2000), has over and over again
been referred to in order to substantiate that aid is an ineﬀective tool in spurring
growth in third world countries. The apparent inconsistency between the old and
the new empirical evidence is intriguing. Therefore, in Section 3, we carefully
examine the cross-country correlations and demonstrate why we believe that plots
of cross-country averages are distorted by identification problems and heterogeneity
biases. Once these problems are taken into account, cross-plots of aid versus growth
and savings support the panel data regression results of a positive impact of aid on
growth.
On this background, we dig deeper in Section 4 and ask whether “good” policies
are a prerequisite for foreign aid to work as argued by Burnside and Dollar (1997,
2000), the World Bank (1998) and Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002). We briefly
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Figure 2: Gross National Savings relative to GNP vs. Aid to GDP. Data are annual
averages over the period 1979-1998 for 114 counties. Gross national savings include
current transfers. Source: World Development Indicators 2001.
explain why the particular empirical results in Burnside and Dollar (2000) have
been questioned by other researchers, and why we find that aid is eﬀective even in
“bad” environments. Finally, based on the theoretical analysis of section 2 and the
work of Sachs and his co-authors (e.g. Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Gallup, Sachs and
Mellinger, 1999), we hypothesize that geography matters for aid eﬀectiveness. In a
Burnside-Dollar type growth equation, it appears that aid is much more eﬀective
in countries outside the geographical tropics. By way of conclusion we suggest that
future research into the causes of climate-related diﬀerences in the impact of aid on
growth could prove to be useful in designing more eﬀective foreign assistance.
2. On Aid Transfers and Growth Theory
The eﬀectiveness of foreign aid depends on whether the transfer involved is used
in a productive and socially meaningful way. It is equally obvious that foreign aid
inflows can be diverted, either directly or indirectly, due to fungibility. If one is
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willing, as a first approximation, to suppress political-economy considerations, a
central concern is whether the incentives of households and producers are such that
aid donations can be successful in raising living standards. In order to address
this issue systematically, the analytical framework has to allow for fungibility as
an endogenous phenomenon. Two prominent workhorses within the field of eco-
nomic growth that allow for optimizing behavior on the part of both producers and
consumers, are the infinite horizon model (due to Ramsey, 1929; Cass, 1965; Koop-
mans, 1965) and the overlapping generations model (Diamond, 1965). Accordingly,
these models are natural starting points for investigating the potential for foreign
aid to spur growth.
The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model has been the more frequent choice in the recent
theoretical literature on aid eﬀectiveness. When aid is assumed to be in the form
of a simple transfer of income, which is distributed equally among the citizens of
society, a very strong result holds: A permanent increase in foreign transfers will
raise the long-run level of per capita consumption one for one, but leave the level
of capital per worker unaﬀected. In other words, aid is fully fungible. This result is
invariant to assumptions made regarding production technology, i.e. whether growth
is exogenous or endogenous.2 Thus, unless the model is somehow modified, aid is
ineﬀective if the goal is to raise long-run income.3
It needs to be recognized, however, that the basic “aid-ineﬀectiveness result” is
not embedded in the assumption of optimizing behavior on the part of households.
Instead it is due to the assumption of infinitely lived individuals. In fact, the con-
clusions emerging from analyzing the eﬀectiveness of aid in a Diamond framework
are not as clear cut as those emerging from the infinite horizon analysis. To show
this formally, we develop a simple two-period endogenous growth version of the
Diamond model, where aid enters as a pure transfer. It emerges that foreign aid
can have a positive eﬀect on growth.
2.1. The Model
Consider a closed economy where activity extends infinitely into the future, but
individuals live only two periods. Time is discrete, and denoted by t = 1, 2 . . . .
The economy produces a homogenous good which can be either consumed or saved
(invested).4 The markets for output and factors of production, labor and capital,
are competitive. For simplicity, the population is assumed to be constant.
2See Obstfeld (1999) for an analysis of aid eﬀectiveness both within a standard infinite horizon
model and within the Uzawa-Lucas model.
3Examples of such modifications can be found in Boone (1996), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001)
and Tornell and Lane (1999).
4As a result, the aid transfer can either be interpreted as a transfer of capital or income.
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Output, Yt, is produced using a standard Cobb-Douglas technology
Yt = Ω
βKβt (EtL)
1−β , (1)
whereKt is the stock of capital, L the total labor force, Et an index measuring labor
eﬃciency, and Ω a time-invariant constant. Empirically, Ω could be thought of as
capturing, in a very crude way, productivity diﬀerences attributable to country
specific factors.5 The work surveyed in Sachs (2001), for example, suggests that
diﬀerences in climate appears to make a diﬀerence in terms of how eﬀectively capital,
labor and technology combine to produce output. An alternative interpretation of
Ω is that it reflects the institutional environment, which is likely to change only
very slowly with time.6
Given the production function the producers will acquire capital and hire labor
until the marginal product equals the real rate of interest, rt, and the real wage,
wt, respectively
7
rt = β
Yt
Kt
wt = (1− β)
Yt
L
.
In order to allow for perpetual growth, labor eﬃciency is assumed to increase over
time, as a consequence of learning-by-doing. In the spirit of Kaldor (1957), we
formalize this by letting eﬃciency expand as output per worker increases:
Et = yt, (2)
where yt ≡ Yt/L. Following Arrow (1962), Romer (1986) and Rebelo (1991), we
assume that firms do not internalize the productive eﬀects from learning. Using
equation (2) in the production function (1) implies that total production can be
written as Yt = ΩKt, once the externality from learning-by-doing is taken into
account. As a result, equilibrium factor prices become
r = βΩ, (3)
wt = (1− β)Ωkt, (4)
where kt ≡ Kt/L. Thus, the real rate of interest will be constant over time, rt = r
∀t, while the wage will rise insofar as capital per worker grows.
Next, consider the consumers. In their first period of life, individuals supply one unit
of labor in-elastically, and they receive a wage, wt. We also let the representative
young individual receive a transfer of income in the shape of foreign aid. To retain
comparability with the infinite horizon result mentioned above, it is assumed that
5Ω is raised to the power of β solely to make the resulting formulas neater.
6Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that the institutions put in place during early colonial times
continue to impact on the growth performance of less developed economies to this very day.
7Capital depreciation is ignored.
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the aid inflow is distributed equally among citizens. Specifically, if the per capita aid
inflow is of size at, then the total income of the representative young individual in
period t is wt+at. In order to capture the flavor of a government that expropriates
part of the inflow (or, the notion that not all inflows are put to “eﬀective” use),
assume that only the fraction π ∈ [0, 1] actually enters the budget of the individual.
The remaining part of the inflow, (1− π) at, is assumed to be wasted.
On this background the individual will choose to divide income between consump-
tion during youth, c1t , and savings, st. In sum, the first period budget constraint
is
c1t + st ≤ wt + πat. (5)
In their second part of life individuals derive income from savings, and receive a
transfer of aid. Hence, the period two budget constraint is
c2t+1 ≤ (1 + r) st + πat+1. (6)
In what follows, aid inflows are allowed to grow over time, and we return to the
empirical plausibility of this possibility. For now, let the growth rate of aid inflows
(α > −1) be exogenous. Thus at+1 = (1 + α)at. Finally, assume that preferences
are logarithmic,
U(c1t , c
2
t+1) = ln c
1
t +
1
1 + ρ
ln c2t+1, (7)
where ρ is the rate of time preference. The problem of a representative young
individual in period t is to maximize discounted lifetime utility subject to the budget
constraints (5) and (6). Standard computations lead to the following closed form
solution to the savings of the young individual
st = s¯w + s¯
µ
1− 1 + ρ
1 + r
(1 + α)
¶
πat,
where the savings rate s¯, is given by 1/ (2 + ρ).8
Note that aid, in general, has an ambiguous eﬀect on savings. To see why, in a
simple manner, consider the case where α = 0. Under this assumption, aid will
increase savings if (and only if) r > ρ, which is equivalent to the condition βΩ > ρ.
Increasing the level of aid, means that income in both periods of life is increased.
If the optimal consumption-age profile is upward sloping, which corresponds to
r > ρ, the consumer will respond to this “windfall gain” by increasing savings so
as maintain the desired profile. On the other hand, if r < ρ the opposite occurs.
Consequently, it is not surprising that insofar as the aid transfer grows over the life
8As individuals are guaranteed an income in period 2, even in the absence of savings, households
might prefer a corner solution where nothing is saved. If such a scenario were to arise, the economy
would “close down” completely, as the entire capital stock is consumed during the second period
of life. In what follows we focus on the more interesting case of an interior solution to the
consumption/savings problem.
6
cycle (α > 0) then it becomes more likely that the consumer will cut savings, in
response to an upward shift in the level of aid, so as to smooth consumption.
Since the capital stock in any given period reflects the savings of the young in
the previous period, the stock of capital per worker in period t + 1 is given by
Kt+1 = stL. After substituting for st, w, and r, the growth rate of capital per
worker can be written
kt+1
kt
= s¯Ω (1− β) + s¯
µ
βΩ− ρ− α (1 + ρ)
1 + βΩ
¶
πat
kt
. (8)
The full dynamics of the model are determined by the law of motion for capital per
worker, and by at+1 = (1 + α) at. The implications of foreign aid for growth will
now depend on whether foreign transfers grow over time or not. We address these
two cases in turn below.
2.2. Constant Aid
When the aid inflow per capita is constant (α = 0), the dynamics of the model
become very simple. Specifically, using yt = Ωkt, equation (8) can be restated in
terms of output growth:
yt+1
yt
= s¯Ω (1− β) + s¯Ω
µ
βΩ− ρ
1 + βΩ
¶
πa
yt
. (9)
If the economy grows exponentially, a/yt will eventually approach zero. Still, the
transition is likely to take time, during which the above equation may provide some
guidance for empirical work.
The lesson from equation (9) is that the overlapping generations analysis oﬀers
a more nuanced conclusion, regarding the eﬀectiveness of aid, than the Ramsey-
Cass-Koopmans model. In particular, if βΩ > ρ, foreign aid has a positive eﬀect on
growth. Of course, the opposite could also be the case. Thus, whether the condition
for aid to be eﬀective is fulfilled or not is an empirical issue to be resolved.9
Equation (9) provides some structural foundation for the approach taken in many
recent empirical investigations of the aid/growth nexus, in that the growth rate
between t and t + 1, is related to the aid to GDP ratio at time t. Moreover,
the model lends theoretical support to the practice of interacting aid with e.g.
institutional variables, since the marginal impact of an (exogenous) increase in a/yt
depends positively on Ω, capturing the influence from (slowly changing) structural
9It is worth noting, however, that the assumption r > ρ is commonly invoked, and deemed
plausible, within the field of economic growth. In particular, when studying endogenous growth
in the infinite horizon model r > ρ is always maintained. Otherwise, consumption per capita will
be perpetually declining, or constant.
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characteristics. The model also implies that such variables should be included on
their own in empirical work.
Next consider the implications of government expropriation. As can be seen from
equation (9), the eﬀectiveness of foreign aid ought to be lower in countries where
government rent-seeking is pervasive, i.e. where π is low.10 The study by Svensson
(2000) indicates that such a channel might be significant. It is worth stressing,
however, that the mere presence of “rent-seeking” does not imply that aid becomes
ineﬀective. For this to hold, the ruling elite must expropriate all inflows. If some
inflows are allowed to enter the budget of the consumers (i.e. π > 0), and given
βΩ > ρ, aid will spur growth.
2.3. Growing Aid
Before we look into the consequences of growing aid, it is worth considering whether
trend growth is an empirically plausible assumption. Figure 3, which shows a his-
togram of growth rates in aid per capita for 114 countries, suggest it is. In fact, in
43 countries the amount of foreign aid inflows exhibited a statistically significant
positive trend, at the five percent level. On the other hand, 27 countries witnessed
a significant negative trend in aid inflows, while the trend growth rate was insignif-
icant in the remaining 44 countries.11 Thus, Figure 3 does suggest that the case of
growing foreign aid inflows is a scenario worth exploring.
When the amount of aid grows over time, the evolution of the economy can be
characterized by the dynamics of the output-to-aid ratio, xt ≡ yt/at:
xt+1 =
s¯Ω (1− β)
1 + α
xt +
s¯Ωπ [βΩ− ρ− α (1 + ρ)]
(1 + α) (1 + βΩ)
≡ f (xt) .
As it turns out, if the model is to allow for a balanced growth path, where the aid
to GDP ratio is constant, the growth rate of aid can neither be too high nor too
low. If
α > α¯ ≡ βΩ− ρ
1 + ρ
,
aid will discourage savings, for the reasons discussed above. On the other hand,
unless
α > αˆ ≡ s¯Ω (1− β)− 1,
10If the government is able to expropriate part of household labor income as well, then π will
also enter the first term on the right hand side of equation (9).
11The three countries where aid inflows declined at rates above ten percent per year are BLR,
KOR and DJI. At the other end of the spectrum, aid rose in excess of ten per cent per year in
twelve countries: MOZ, IRN, ZAF, GNB, CHN, LAO, KHM, ZWE, VNM, MDA, NAM and ARM.
Using a (Newey-West) robust variance estimator marginally changes the grouping of countries.
The main result that most countries have had significant trend growth in per capita aid over the
years is unchanged.
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Figure 3: Histogram of growth rates in foreign aid per capita, 1970-99. The growth
rates are least squares trend estimates. Source: World Development Indicators
2001.
the aid to output ratio will tend to zero. Thus, if α < αˆ the dynamics of the model
will be the same as in the preceding section, where the aid inflows were assumed
constant.
Accordingly, balanced growth, with a constant aid to GDP ratio, is only possible if
α¯ > α > αˆ. (10)
Figure 4 shows the phase diagram for this case. Geometrically, the condition
(10) ensures that the slope of f (xt) is less than one, and that f (0) > 0.
12 Given
a positive initial output-to-aid ratio, x0, the economy will eventually reach the
balanced growth path, where the output to aid ratio is given by
x∗ =
s¯Ωπ [βΩ− ρ− α (1 + ρ)]
[1 + α− s¯Ω (1− β)] [1 + βΩ] .
As a consequence, along a balanced growth path the growth rate of income is
12The condition required for this scenario to be viable is that α¯ > αˆ. This condition is fulfilled
if (1 + βΩ) / [(1− β)Ω] > (1 + ρ) / (2 + ρ). In order to ensure that this condition is met for any
Ω and ρ, one would need to assume that β ≥ 1/2. This is not an unreasonable requirement if one
takes a broad view of capital so as to include human capital. An alternative way of approaching
the plausibility of the condition could be the following. Suppose β = 1/3, which is a standard
approximation. Next, calibrate Ω so that plausible values of r are attained (say, in the range zero
to ten percent). Finally, use these numbers in the condition α¯ > αˆ. It emerges that the condition
is easily met.
9
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xt+1 xt+1=xt
f(xt)
x*x0
Figure 4: Phasediagram when α¯ > α > αˆ.
determined by the growth rate of foreign aid:
yt =
s¯Ωπ [βΩ− ρ− α (1 + ρ)]
[1 + α− s¯Ω (1− β)] [1 + βΩ] · a0 · (1 + α)
t .
Hence, at the balanced growth path, only permanent changes in the growth rate of
foreign aid will have permanent growth eﬀects. The level of aid matters, but only
for the level of income per worker. The transition to the balanced growth path may,
however, be a lengthy one.
The implications of the transitional dynamics can be assessed by picking an initial
output to aid ratio. Considering many of the least developed economies, where an
aid to GDP ratio around 10 per cent is not uncommon, it is sensible to consider a
case where x0 < x
∗, i.e. where the initial level of income per worker is relatively
low, compared to the aid inflow. As can be seen from Figure 4, during transition
the growth rate of x will gradually decrease. Since at grows at a constant rate
throughout, the growth rate of income per worker will decline. Thus, something
akin to “conditional β-convergence” is at work: the growth rate of income per worker
will be higher in economies that are further away from their future balanced growth
path. Moreover, the long-run output-to-aid ratio is endogenous, and determined by
structural characteristics (Ω,π and α). As a result, the relationship between initial
aid to GDP and subsequent growth is not a simple one. Basically, the growth
performance of two economies with the same aid to GDP ratio will diﬀer insofar as
their structural characteristics, and therefore x∗, diﬀer. This underlines once again
the importance of careful empirical work where relevant structural characteristics
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are controlled for. Finally, it is interesting to note that this scenario provides
a theoretical foundation for an aid “Laﬀer-curve” in terms of the growth rates:
Increasing the growth rate of aid will spur growth, but only as long as α < α¯. If the
rate of growth is increased beyond α¯, consumer’s will respond by reducing savings,
and growth will suﬀer.
2.4. Endogenous Aid, Convergence and Total Factor Productivity
Based on the above analysis, it would appear that suﬃciently large transfers (i.e.,
α > αˆ) ought to allow the poorest countries to converge in income relative to
the presently developed economies. Yet, this attractive scenario is not likely to
arise. For one thing, the ability of aid to raise growth is bounded from above by α¯.
Moreover, recall that the growth rate of foreign aid was assumed exogenously given.
This is unrealistic. Assume instead that the growth rate is tied to donor policies,
and equally important, to GDP growth of donor countries. This can be represented
formally in a simple manner, by allowing total aid donations (i.e. to the LDCs as
a group) to be linked to total donor GDP, yˆt, by a factor, δt, which may itself be
time-varying. Thus, at time t, total aid is given by
at = δtyˆt.
Now, suppose the GDP of the donor community as a whole grows at a constant
rate, g. Then the growth rate of aid will be
αt = log (δt+1/δt) + g.
Clearly, if δt+1 < δt, the growth rate of poor economies will fall short of growth in
donor countries.13 Only insofar as δt+1 > δt will the less developed economies (as
a group) tend to “catch-up”.14 Since continual growth in δ is politically infeasible,
this simple illustration shows that aid, alone, is unlikely to ensure convergence. In
sum, although the analysis demonstrates that foreign aid can be an eﬀective way
of stimulating income growth in the third world, the model also makes clear that
structural characteristics will have to change, if the poorest are to become richer
relative to the developed world.
Analyzing the role of aid in a stationary overlapping generations economy would
lead to conclusions similar in nature to those obtained above, given the assump-
tions on production technology and preferences. However, if one allows for a more
13A similar point was made already by Leontief (1965), who sought to calculate the necessary
amount of aid that would allow the less developed group of countries to converge.
14This is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition. Suppose we allow for growth in the work
force (which was ignored in the analysis above). In that case at = δtyˆt(Lˆt/Lt), where Lˆt is the
population in the donor countries, and Lt the population in the LDCs. Accordingly the growth
rate of aid per capita is α = log (δt+1/δt) + g + nˆ − n, where nˆ and n is the growth rate of the
population in the group of donor countries and the LDCs, respectively, while g is growth in the
per capita GDP of the donor community. Hence, if nˆ < n then log (δt+1/δt) > 0 is required to
hinder divergence in per capita income.
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general production technology, or utility function, a multiplicity of steady states
may emerge, a prediction consistent with the hypothesis of club convergence.15 If
so, temporary inflows of foreign aid may have permanent eﬀects on long-run activ-
ity, by shifting the economy away from a low-development trap into a high-income
equilibrium, thus underpinning a more optimistic view of the potential for aid to
stimulate a process of convergence.16
A final issue is the implied relationship between aid and total factor productivity.
Recent research on the proximate sources of growth suggests that the bulk of the
diﬀerences in income and growth, between “rich” and “poor” economies, is due
to total factor productivity (see Klenow and Rodrigues-Clare, 1997; Easterly and
Levine, 2001). The model developed above provides a reason why aid might have
a positive eﬀect on TFP. Note that the growth rate of TFP is (using equation (1))
log
Yt+1
Yt
− β log Kt+1
Kt
= (1− β) log Et+1
Et
.
Since TFP growth is caused by learning by doing, and this in turn derives from
capital accumulation, the model implies that aid can potentially have a conducive
eﬀect on TFP growth. In practice, other channels connecting aid to TFP may be
at work, and some of these may work in the opposite direction. The impact of aid
on TFP is therefore an empirical matter well worth exploring.17 Doing so is beyond
the scope of the present paper. Instead we now move on, first to the older, and
subsequently to the more recent empirical evidence on aid and growth.
3. On the Correlations Between Aid, Growth and Savings
Much of the early empirical aid eﬀectiveness contributions focused on cross-country
correlations between aid, on the one hand, and the savings rate or GDP growth, on
the other. Such investigations have regularly led to the conclusion that aid is (at
best) ineﬀective in furthering growth. In what follows, we therefore take a closer
look at the data, discussing first the aid-growth and subsequently the aid-savings
relationship.
15See Galor and Ryder (1989) for a comprehensive treatment of this issue within the Diamond
framework.
16Note, however, that in a stationary economy the real interest rate is endogenous. Bearing the
condition for aid-eﬀectiveness in mind, i.e. r > ρ, the model would potentially motivate an aid
“Laﬀer-curve” in terms of levels, rather than growth rates.
17Hansen and Tarp (2001) show that foreign aid has no eﬀect on growth once investment in
capital — physical and human — is accounted for. This does not preclude the possibility that aid
spurs total factor productivity through its eﬀect on capital accumulation.
12
3.1. Output Growth and Aid
In debates about the aid-growth link, cross-plots such as the one in Figure 1 have
been widely used. This may, however, be misleading due to two distinct analytical
problems. The first is a problem of identification. The second relates to cross-
country heterogeneity.
To illustrate the identification problem, consider a simple two-equation system of
aid and per capita GDP:
∆ log yit = g + γλ1i + θ1ait − γ(log yit−1 − g(t− 1)) + εit, (11)
ait = λ2i − θ2 log yit−1 + ηit. (12)
In this system yit is per capita GDP and ait is the aid-to-GDP ratio in country i
and period t. The change in log GDP, ∆ log yit, approximates the average growth
rate from period t− 1 to t.18
Equation (11) is the relation of interest in aid eﬀectiveness studies. In the present
formulation, the economies in question are assumed to converge to a steady state.
This is modeled by the inclusion of lagged per capita GDP in conjunction with the
country specific intercept, λ1i, which we take to include country specific structural
characteristics such as the institutional infrastructure (Ω in Section 2). The steady
state growth rate in GDP per capita, in the absence of aid, is given by g, which
may be endogenous, while the impact of aid on growth is θ1.
Equation (12) is a model of aid allocation. In the present context it is as simple
as possible. Aid to country i in period t is a function of lagged GDP per capita in
the recipient countries and country specific factors gathered in λ2i. Poverty orien-
tation in aid allocation is well documented and the use of lagged income variables is
standard in aid allocation studies capturing information and decision lags in donor
countries. Two influential aid allocation studies by Dudley and Montmarquette
(1976) and by Trumbull and Wall (1994) both find a significant negative impact of
lagged GNP per capita on aid commitments. In a more recent study Alesina and
Dollar (2000) use PPP adjusted GDP per capita as the income variable and five
year averages of aid disbursements as the dependent variable. The result that most
donors give more aid to poorer countries remains unchanged. Alesina and Dollar
argue that historical and political factors, such as colonial past and support in UN
voting, are also important in aid allocation decisions. Such factors are included in
the country specific intercept λ2i.
Assuming the two error terms εit and ηit are martingale diﬀerence processes or-
thogonal to the regressors and to each other, the system can be estimated equation
wise using ordinary regression. The identifying assumption is the recursive nature
of the system. Aid allocation is based on information about past income per capita
while aid impacts on present and future growth rates in income. In the econometric
18The periods are often thought of as representing years but longer periods are possible.
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jargon aid is weakly exogenous with respect to the parameter θ1. But aid is not
strongly exogenous as income Granger-causes aid.
However, the cross-plot in Figure 1 and many aid-growth regressions are based on
cross-country studies using averages over 10-30 years. This simple transformation
implies that the recursive structure of the aid-growth system is lost. Impact and
allocation eﬀects are no longer identified. In Appendix A it is shown how the two
equations for averages over T periods can be given as
∆ log yi. = g +
1−ψT
T
λ1i +
1−ψT
(1−ψ)T θ1ai. −
1−ψT
T
log yi0
+
1
T
T−1X
t=1
ψt[θ1(aiT−t − ai.) + εiT−t] (13)
ai. = λ2i − T (1− 12
T+1
T
)θ2∆ log yi. − θ2 log yi0
−θ2
TX
t=1
T−t
T
(∆ log yit −∆ log yi.) + ηi., (14)
where ψ = 1− γ, and the notation xi. indicates average over t.
Equations (13) and (14) illustrate a classical identification problem in economet-
rics. Growth and aid are positively related in the impact equation, while they are
negatively related in the allocation equation. Notice that in both equations the
impact of initial income is negative. If the number of periods, T , is not explicitly
taken into account there are no parameter restrictions to exploit in this formulation,
suggesting that conclusions about the eﬀectiveness of aid may well be biased.
Moreover, note that the impact slope parameter ((1−ψT )/(1−ψ))θ1 in the growth
equation is down-weighted by the number of periods in the average, while the al-
location slope parameter 1/θ2 is only down-weighted by approximately one-half of
the number of periods. A consequence of this scaling is that we should expect the
negative allocation correlation to dominate in long-term averages.
A third interesting result is related to the growth rates in the aid transfers, given in
Figure 3. The cross-country error term in equation (13) shows that countries with
significant trend growth (positive or negative) will have larger errors than countries
with constant aid inflows. This means that the cross-country aid-growth correlation
is highly influenced by countries with “extreme” aid records.
The recent move away from pure cross-country analyses towards panel data analyses
of averages over fairly short periods helps solve both the heteroskedasticity problem
and, more importantly, the identification problem. At least, one would expect to
find smaller bias in the estimated impact parameter. It is illuminating to see what
happens graphically. Figure 5 is a cross-plot of 532 panel data observations using
epochs of four years instead of the 20-year averages for the same 114 countries
presented in Figure 1. The correlation between the average growth rate in GDP
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Figure 5: Real per capita GDP growth vs. the Aid to GDP ratio. Data are annual
averages for five 4-year epochs (1979-1982 to 1995-1998) for 115 counties. Source:
World Development Indicators 2001.
per capita and the average aid to GDP ratio based on epochs of four years is clearly
less negative than the pure cross-country correlation based on 20 year averages in
Figure 1. Moreover, the correlation is no longer significant. This is an indirect
confirmation of the identification problem.
Still, the cross-plot in Figure 5 is based on an implicit assumption; strictly speak-
ing, the assumption in this kind of graphic analysis is that institutions are either
equal (λ1i = λ1 for all i) or unimportant for growth. We find this highly unlikely.
Institutions are not equal across countries and they certainly matter for growth.
This implies that the regression line in Figure 5 is subject to heterogeneity bias.
Assuming institutions change slowly, a simple way to diminish the bias is to plot
the epoch values while removing country specific eﬀects. Figure 6 gives a cross-plot
of these fixed eﬀects panel observations for the 114 countries. Here the correlation
between growth and aid inflows is positive and significant. We would argue that
this verifies that diﬀerences in institutions influence the cross-country correlations
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Figure 6: Real per capita GDP growth vs. the Aid to GDP ratio. Data are annual
averages for five 4-year epochs (1979-1982 to 1995-1998) given as deviations from
the country specific means. Source: World Development Indicators 2001.
in Figures 1 and 5 in a way that leads to misinterpretation of the data.19
3.2. Savings and Aid
Empirical work on aid eﬀectiveness in the 1970s also focused on the relationship be-
tween domestic savings and the aid to GNP ratio. Indeed, many theoretical growth
models give ample motivation: all else equal, if the savings rate increases, long-run
income should rise. Hence, investigating the relationship between domestic sav-
ings and aid inflows appears as a convenient short-cut in studying aid eﬀectiveness.
Most studies uncovered a negative correlation between aid and savings, consistent
with Figure 2, which shows a (significant) negative correlation between the average
19An important corollary of the identification problem is that the popular random eﬀects estima-
tor should be avoided in panel data regressions where aid is included as a regressor. The random
eﬀects estimator is basically a weighted average of the pure cross-country parameter given in Fig-
ure 1 and the fixed eﬀects parameter in Figure 6, and we have shown that the pure cross-country
coeﬃcient cannot be interpreted as an impact parameter.
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savings rate and the aid to GNP ratio. But what does this negative savings/aid
correlation actually mean?
First of all the identification and heterogeneity problems are, naturally, also present
in the aid-savings relationship insofar as savings is related to growth. But in ad-
dition to the econometric problems there are more fundamental theoretical issues,
which may distort the interpretation of any aid-savings correlations.
Suppose, for example, that aid increases productivity growth. Following the perma-
nent income hypothesis, this would induce agents to start consuming more so as to
smooth consumption in line with the higher expected lifetime income. Accordingly,
the savings rate falls if agents are suﬃciently risk averse.
The implications of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model amount to another way of
approaching this. In this model, aid increases consumption one for one, but leaves
investment and production unaﬀected in the long run. To see what this implies,
denote total consumption, savings and the gross national product C, S and Q,
respectively. By identity, GNP is the sum of GDP, or Y , and total aid inflows, A.
Hence Q = Y +A. Let total consumption be given by C = C˜ +A, where C˜ is the
level of consumption if aid were absent. Accordingly, S/Q = 1− (C˜ +A)/(Y +A).
Note that an increase in A leads to an increase in the (C˜ + A)/(Y + A) ratio, as
long as C˜ < Y . Assuming this holds, it follows that when consumption increases
on a one for one basis with aid, the savings rate will decline when A increases.
In sum, taking the negative correlation for granted, several conclusions are possible.
They include that (i) aid discourages savings, (ii) aid increases the long-run growth
rate of productivity or (iii) aid has no eﬀect on accumulation whatsoever.
Even though these considerations make us skeptical about the aid eﬀectiveness
information in aid-savings correlations we give the “fixed eﬀects” plot in Figure 7
to compare with Figure 2. The sample of countries is the same as in Figure 6,
with each point representing four year averages of St/Qt and At/Qt. As for the
aid-growth relation, the negative cross-country correlation (Figure 2) turns into a
significant positive correlation. This result enhances our confidence in the existence
of a positive relationship between aid and growth. Certainly, the above illustration
is in line with evidence pointing to a conducive eﬀect from aid on investments
(Hansen and Tarp, 2001). In the next section we move on to cross-country growth
regressions in which we take account of diﬀerences in policies and institutions by
conditioning directly on policy and institutional measures instead of removing the
eﬀects using deviations from country specific means. Moreover, we discuss non-
linear eﬀects of aid.
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Figure 7: Gross National Savings relative to GNP vs. Aid to GNP. Data are annual
averages for five 4-year epochs (1979-1982 to 1995-1998) given as deviations from the
country specific means. Gross national savings include current transfers. Source:
World Development Indicators 2001.
4. On Aid and Growth Regressions
Development economists have always stressed that “good” policy genuinely matters
for growth, and also in the ongoing exchange of opinions about aid eﬀectiveness
there is little disagreement that policies matter for growth. Instead, the discussion
centers around the question whether bad policies — in addition to being detrimental
to growth — implies that aid is wasted or maybe even harmful, to an extent that
this is of statistical and economic interest. Cast in terms of Figures 6 and 7 the
question is whether the slopes of the regression lines are functions of policies or not.
Barro type growth regressions on panel data have been used extensively in this
controversy about the importance of good macroeconomic policy in aid receiving
countries. The origin of the debate was the analysis by Burnside and Dollar, first cir-
culated as a World Bank working paper in 1996-97, later published in the American
Economic Review (Burnside and Dollar, 1997, 2000). The results of this analysis
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also provided part of the scientific background for the policy recommendations in
the World Bank policy research report Assessing Aid (World Bank, 1998). The
basic result was that aid spurs growth, but only in countries with good macroeco-
nomic performance in the form of low budget deficits (preferably surpluses), low
inflation and openness to trade. This influence of policy on the marginal impact
of aid on growth was introduced in the regressions via an interaction term between
aid and a policy index, later referred to as the Burnside-Dollar policy index.
While numerous writers have over the years suggested that such a link might be
present, disagreement has always existed about the identification of exactly which
policies are crucial. Hence, if the three policies emphasized by Burnside and Dollar
were robust determinants of the “return” on aid, this would indeed be a major
breakthrough. From this perspective, it is disappointing that this aid eﬀectiveness
result did not stand up to closer scrutiny. The studies by Dalgaard and Hansen
(2001), Guillamont and Chauvet (2001), Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), Hudson
and Mosley (2001), Lensink and White (2001) and Lu and Ram (2001) all test
an interaction term between the Burnside-Dollar policy index and aid using either
diﬀerent data sets, diﬀerent regression specifications or diﬀerent estimators. They
all find the interaction to be statistically insignificant. To our knowledge, the only
study supporting the Burnside-Dollar interaction term is Collier and Dehn (2001).
They include measures of export price shocks in the regression model, but this result
appears sensitive to alternative measurements of the export price shocks.
The diﬃculty in finding a clear and positive estimate of interaction between policies
and aid should not be regarded as an empirical curiosity. It makes perfect sense
from a theoretical point of view as illustrated by Dalgaard and Hansen (2001). They
develop a model where the interaction between aid and policy is ambiguous. In the
model, aid increases the level of consumption. This reduces the degree of socio-
political instability, which is good for growth.20 Government activity is limited to
raising taxes and providing public goods. Examples of the latter include a well-
functioning court system, public security and so forth. In this example, “good
policies” tend to reduce the ramifications of social unrest. Now, suppose aid only
works through reducing instability, and suppose government intervention gradually
manages to remove the harmful eﬀects of social discontent (i.e., in terms of capital
accumulation). In that case, the actions of the government will in fact tend to
reduce the ‘return’ on aid. Nevertheless, government actions are, by themselves,
stimulating growth. We view this as a simple illustration of a more general idea.
In practice, aid is likely to aﬀect growth through a host of channels. As a result,
the return to aid is likely to be aﬀected by numerous and widely diﬀering policy
measures. Some policies may be substitutes for aid inflows (as in the example
above), while others are better perceived of as complements. This implies that a
composite index of policies may encapsulate some components that enhance the
20The notion that foreign aid may buy political stability was early on suggested by Chenery
and Strout (1966).
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return to aid, while others diminish this impact. In the end, the net eﬀect may well
turn out insignificant.
Aside from provoking a heated debate on policy conditionality and selectivity in
allocating aid, the Burnside and Dollar analysis also stimulated a series of results
about non-linear eﬀects of aid on growth. Indeed, the single most common result
in recent empirical studies is that aid has a positive impact on real GDP per capita
growth, but displays diminishing returns (Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Hansen and
Tarp, 2000, 2001; Lensink and White, 2001). A possibly related finding is that
instability of aid inflows appears to have a negative influence on growth, while the
level of inflows has a positive impact (Lensink and Morrissey, 2000). In the same
vein, Guillamont and Chauvet (2001) introduce a new interaction term and find
important interactions between aid and an index measuring instability in terms of
trade, real value of exports and agricultural value added.
As seen, a common finding in recent aid eﬀectiveness studies is that determinants
of the marginal impact of aid on growth appear to be more or less outside the direct
control of the recipient countries. This is in stark contrast to the idea (and rhetoric)
of the 1998 World Bank policy report. In recent research Collier and Dollar (2001,
2002) try to invigorate the debate by introducing the World Bank Country Policy
and Institutional Assessment index (CPIA) in growth regressions. They show that
an interaction term between aid and CPIA has a highly significant, positive eﬀect,
bringing us back to the claim that aid spurs growth in a good policy environment.
However, the introduction of the CPIA index in the present context is questionable
on several accounts.
First of all, the lessons to be drawn from the positive interaction term are in reality
hard to pinpoint. The strength of the original Burnside-Dollar hypothesis was
the claim that a small set of policies could be singled out as crucial. The CPIA
index, on the other hand, assesses the quality of a country’s present policy and
institutional framework in 20 diﬀerent dimensions.21 Thus, in terms of drawing-up
clear-cut recommendations for policy makers on how to enhance the eﬀectiveness
of aid, the analysis is not particularly helpful. Trade-oﬀs between elements of the
index are bound to arise in practice. For example, placing greater emphasis on
budget balance (a component of “Economic Management”) could conceivably be
in conflict with improving access to health care, education etc. (the component
“Building Human Resources” which belongs to the general group of “Policies for
Social Inclusion/Equity”).22
21These 20 items are assessed (by World Bank experts) on a scale from 1 to 6 (measuring
“unsatisfactory for an extended period” to “good for an extented period”). Each item has a
5 percent weight in the overall rating. The items are grouped into four categories: “Economic
Management”, “Structural Policies”, “Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity” and “Public Sector
Management and Institutions”.
22It is also interesting to take note of how the World Bank defines “quality” of a country’s
present policies and institutions. Quality means how conductive that framework is in fostering
poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and the eﬀective use of development assistance.
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Table 1: Rank correlations with CPIA in 1999
Overall Economic Structural Social Public sector
Index Management Policies Inclusion Management
ICRG97 (43) 0.46 0.40 0.29 0.54 0.51
[0.00] [0.01] [0.06] [0.00] [0.00]
Fraction of land in tropics (61) −0.23 −0.26 −0.21 −0.23 −0.11
[0.08] [0.04] [0.11] [0.07] [0.39]
Notes: Spearman rank correlations with p-values for test of independence in brackets. The number
of observations are given in parentheses. The CIPA gradings for 1999 are obtained from News and
Notices for IMF and World Bank Watchers, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2000.
A second concern is endogeneity. There is ample evidence, that “policies” and
growth are jointly endogenous variables. For example, Clague et al. (1996) and
Mauro (1995) argue that good economic performance increases institutional eﬃ-
ciency, and Mauro goes on to highlight that using expert evaluations may be prob-
lematic. The argument is that an evaluator is likely to conclude that a particular
set of institutions is good if the country in question is growing rapidly.
Unfortunately, it is currently impossible to investigate directly whether endogeneity
of the CPIA index is an issue,as the data are not in the public domain. However,
indirect evidence does shed light on what any further analysis is likely to find.
In a recent study, Chong and Calderon (2000) use Granger-causality tests to exam-
ine possible feedback between two institutional quality measures (BERI and ICRG)
and economic growth. Using 5-year averages, they find strong Granger-causal im-
pact from growth to institutions while the causality from institutions to growth is
weak. Using 10-year periods there is significant causality both ways. The Chong
and Calderon analysis does not include the CPIA index, so it is instructive to com-
pare the institutional quality indexes and the CPIA. We obtained CPIA data from
News and Notices for IMF and World Bank Watchers, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2000. Even
though this is not exactly the World Bank CPIA data, this variable would appear
to be capable of providing a pretty good indication of the concordance between the
CPIA and publicly available data.
In Table 1, we report Spearman correlations between the CPIA and the Knack
and Keefer ICRG index in 1997.23 In addition, we show correlations with the
four sub-groupings, used to construct the overall CPIA index. There is quite a
strong concordance between the ICRG index in 1997 and the CPIA in 1999, and
independence of the two measures is rejected at conventional levels of significance.
As shown by Chong and Calderon part of the changes in the ICRG index is caused by
economic growth — or some underlying factor aﬀecting both growth and institutional
ratings. It is also of interest to note that the ICRG97 index is closely correlated with
23Knack and Keefer (1995) constructed a “Property rights index” (ICRG82) from five ICRG
indicators: Corruption in government, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, repudiation of contracts
by government and risk of expropriation. We use same indictors in an index for 1997 (ICRG97).
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each of the sub-groups in the CPIA. Hence, it seems diﬃcult to speak of “changing
policies” without “changing institutions”.
To be sure, these insights do not per se invalidate the regression results in Collier
and Dollar (2001, 2002). However, they do justify a certain amount of skepticism
regarding the policy relevance and appropriateness of using these regressions in
counter-factual scenarios such as the re-allocation of aid based on good CPIA rat-
ings. If the CPIA index is Granger-caused by growth it should not be used as an
exogenous variable in forecasts and policy simulations. In finding a way around this
problem, it seems worthwhile to move in the direction of applying strictly exogenous
factors, with adequate explanatory power, in empirical work on the topic of how to
allocate aid. In what follows we make a foray in this direction.
The second part of Table 1 shows that a key geographic variable is correlated
with the components of the CPIA. Specifically, the fraction of land area in the
geographical tropics in a given country is negatively correlated with the CPIA.
The correlation is mainly though an association with the measures of economic
management.24 This finding is in full accord with the contributions by Bloom and
Sachs (1998), Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) as well as other recent studies.
Both Bloom and Sachs and Gallup et al. show that geography, in the form of tropi-
cal land area, tropical diseases (malaria) and landlockedness, significantly influences
growth in GDP per capita from 1965 to 1990 and in both studies several channels
through which geography may impact on growth (and policy) are discussed. Ace-
moglu et al. (2001) oﬀer an alternative explanation by relating geography to the
nature of institutions created by European colonists. Thus, although the precise
modus operandi of geography is open to debate, the exogeneity of tropical land area
would appear unquestionable over the time horizon in question.
As regards a possible interaction of aid and geographic circumstances, the formal
model presented in Section 2 certainly motivates taking a closer look insofar as
bad climate leads to low factor productivity. Another possibility is that mortality
matters for the return on aid. Suppose, for example, that foreign aid spurs human
capital accumulation by improving the access to formal education. According to
Sachs (2001), countries placed in temperate climate zones tend to have significantly
longer life spans than individuals living in non-temperate climate zones, controlling
for income. Obviously, a higher mortality rate will reduce the total eﬀect of aid-
induced human capital accumulation. Thus, a possible link between aid and climate
may run through the association of the latter with health status. One can think
of other likely candidates for an explanation. In any event, the hypothesis of an
important interaction between aid and geographic factors is plausible, and therefore
worth exploring.
In Table 2 we estimate models of average annual per capita GDP growth using
24See Bloom and Sachs (1998) for a description of the tropical area variable. We obtained the
variable from the CID homepage: www.cid.harvard.edu.
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Table 2: Growth regressions: The impact of aid and geography
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method GMM GMM GMM OLS
Real per capita GDP (log) −0.354 −0.241 −0.390 −0.672
(0.47) (0.33) (0.53) (0.95)
Budget surplus (% GDP) 0.094∗ 0.076∗ 0.072∗ 0.047
(3.33) (2.46) (2.52) (1.23)
Inflation −1.293∗ −1.278∗ −1.118∗ −1.139∗
(2.82) (2.74) (2.48) (2.65)
Openness 1.788∗ 1.750∗ 1.753∗ 1.968∗
(3.61) (3.73) (3.76) (3.89)
Assassinations −0.455 −0.407 −0.370 −0.365
(1.76) (1.73) (1.57) (1.46)
Assassin. x Ethnic fract. 0.853∗ 0.812 0.759 0.725
(1.96) (1.92) (1.82) (1.66)
Ethnic fract. 0.468 0.746 0.589 0.021
(0.53) (0.89) (0.69) (0.03)
Institutional quality 0.881∗ 0.758∗ 0.763∗ 0.701∗
(4.39) (3.79) (4.04) (3.64)
Sub-Saharan Africa −3.208∗ −2.492∗ −2.217∗ −1.357
(3.63) (3.02) (2.72) (1.55)
East Asia 1.333∗ 1.833∗ 1.845∗ 1.622∗
(2.11) (3.08) (3.07) (2.65)
Aid (EDA/GDP %) 1.071∗ 1.110∗ 1.818∗ 1.480∗
(2.33) (2.55) (3.90) (3.61)
Aid squared −0.099∗ −0.098∗ −0.063 −0.018
(2.36) (2.60) (1.54) (0.76)
Fraction of land in tropics −2.259∗ −1.424∗ −1.101∗
(4.90) (2.40) (2.06)
Aid x fraction of land in tropics −1.099∗ −1.402∗
(2.07) (3.29)
P-value of Hansen J-test 0.58 0.77 0.78
Observations 231 231 231 231
Notes: Panel regressions of 54 countries over five 4 year epochs (1974-77 to 1990-93). The de-
pendent variable is real per capita GDP growth. Time dummies are included in all regressions.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses in the OLS regression. * significant at 5 percent. Common
instuments in GMM regressions: aid, aid squared, aid x openness, aid x inflation (all lagged one
period). Instrument added in regression (3): “aid x fraction of land in tropics” lagged one period.
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a panel of 54 countries over five 4-year epochs.25 The baseline equation is simi-
lar to the specifications in Burnside and Dollar (2000) with the modifications in
choice of instruments and impact of aid suggested in Dalgaard and Hansen (2001).
Hence, in the baseline equation, growth is a function of initial income in each epoch,
public savings as a per cent of GDP, inflation, openness, ethnic fractionalization,
assassinations, quality of institutions, Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia regional
dummies, and aid. Arguably, some of the regressors are likely to be endogenous.
However, to facilitate comparison with earlier results, we have chosen to keep the
Burnside-Dollar type specification.
The results of the baseline model are in line with earlier findings. All variables
have the expected/established signs, but the eﬀects of initial income and ethnic
fractionalization are imprecisely determined. Aid is modeled as an endogenous
regressor and hence instrumented, basically using functions of lagged aid.26 It
appears once again that aid has a positive, but diminishing impact on growth.
In regression 2 of Table 2 we add the measure of the fraction of land area in ge-
ographical tropics. Note that tropical areas have a highly significant negative im-
pact on growth. Moreover, the impact of other control variables remains largely
unchanged compared to the baseline equation. Specifically, the Sub-Saharan Africa
dummy only drops a little and retains statistical, as well as economic, significance;
and the marginal impact of aid stays largely unchanged.
The impact of tropical land area is rather large in regression 2 compared to the
findings in Bloom and Sachs and Gallup et al. One explanation for this result is
given in regression 3 in which we add an interaction term between aid and the
fraction of tropical land area. Again, there are only small changes in the impact
of the basic control variables. Compared to regression 2 the direct negative growth
eﬀect of tropical areas is lowered to just above one percentage point, while the
estimated impact of aid changes radically. Diminishing returns implied by the
quadratic function are replaced by a spline function in which the marginal impact
of aid in the sub-tropic and temperate zone countries is about twice the impact
in tropical areas. According to these estimates, a one percentage point increase
in the aid ratio in a tropical country (say, Cameroon) will spur a 0.7 percentage
point increase in the growth rate. The same increase in a non-tropical country
(say, Tunesia) is expected to lead to a 1.8 percentage point increase in the rate of
growth.27
To avoid any further discussion about the use of instrumental variable regressions
25The data are from Burnside and Dollar (2000). Aid is measured using Eﬀective Development
Assistance as a percent of GDP (Chang, Fernandez-Arias and Serven, 1998).
26This choice of instruments is directly motivated by the allocation equation (12).
27The growth eﬀect of increased aid may seem excessive. Yet, recall that in the present model it
is not a permanent growth eﬀect. There is probably conditional convergence taking place — partly
working through aid allocation. Moreover, increasing the aid to GDP ratio in Cameroon by a one
percentage point would require additional grants in the order of 92 million USD in 1999.
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and the choice of instruments, we finally report results using OLS in regression 4.
The main result is unaltered: Aid has a much higher impact on growth in non-
tropical countries.
5. Conclusion
The need for growth and development is as great as ever if we are to come even
close to the United Nations target of halving world poverty by 2015. The central
message of the present paper is that aid can play a significant conductive role in
reaching such a target. At the same time it should be recognized that aid is not a
panacea for poverty reduction.
To substantiate the central message we studied aid eﬀectiveness within a simple
growth model based on first principles. Our analysis demonstrates that foreign
aid — in the form of a simple transfer of income — is likely to spur growth under
fairly standard assumptions with respect to preferences, technology, etc. At the
same time, however, the model also demonstrated that the growth rate of foreign
aid inflows is potentially an important parameter. Since a substantial group of the
aid receiving countries has experienced significant trend growth in aid per capita,
attention to this issue appears warranted. In particular, the analysis suggests that,
when foreign assistance is expanded quickly it is harder to ensure that aid is eﬀective.
Exploring this issue further, quantitatively, appears to be useful. Finally, our model
also provides a theoretical foundation for the approach taken in empirical work in
recent years. This includes the practice of regressing the aid to GDP level on growth
rates and allowing for interaction eﬀects with slow moving structural characteristics.
Turning to the empirical results, we started out by demonstrating that cross-country
data such as those underlying Figure 1 and 2 are fully consistent with the positive
aid-growth results emerging from panel-based econometric work. Once we account
for problems associated with identification and country specific heterogeneity, past
and present research are reconciled. Looking at empirical relations between aid, on
the one hand, and growth and saving on the other using standard fixed eﬀects trans-
formations clealy suggests that much of the debate about the macro eﬀectiveness of
foreign aid has been held back by focussing on pure cross-country correlations. The
recent empirical evidence demonstrating that aid is eﬀective is in our assessment
convincing. Political decisions on curbing aid cannot be justified, arguing that aid
has no impact.
We subsequently justified why we believe that the endogeneity of policies and insti-
tutions should be taken more serious than in much of the existing analytical work.
This was followed by empirical evidence on the possible interaction between geo-
graphic circumstances and aid. The formal model developed in Section 2 motivates
such interaction, and more generally we identified several reasons why climate may
matter for the eﬀect of aid. The climate-related diﬀerences in the impact of aid on
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growth identified in this paper are important. We therefore suggest it would be a
fruitful avenue for future research to investigate which mechanisms are driving the
result. This information could potentially be used in the quest for designing more
eﬀective foreign assistance, to the benefit of the growth of poor nations.
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A. Derivation of the cross-country aid impact and aid allo-
cation equations
A.1. The impact equation
The growth equation (11) is identical to a first order autoregressive levels equation,
where ψ = 1− γ:
log yit − g t− λ1i = θ1ait + ψ(log yit−1 − g(t− 1)− λ1i) + εit.
From this formulation, present income (time T ) can be expressed as a function of
initial income (time 0) using the moving average representation
log yiT − g T − λ1i =
T−1X
t=1
ψt(θ1aiT−t + εiT−t) + ψ
T (log yi0 − λ1i).
Now, define average aid over the period 1, . . . , T as ai. =
1
T
PT
t=1 ait; add and
subtract this average and reduce the resulting equation to
log yiT = g T + (1− ψT )λ1i + {(1− ψT )/(1− ψ)}θ1ai.
+ ψT log yi0 +
T−1X
t=1
ψt{θ1(aiT−t − ai.) + εiT−t}.
Finally, subtracting log yi0 and dividing by T we get the average growth rate on the
left hand side
∆ log yi. = g +
1−ψT
T
λ1i +
1−ψT
(1−ψ)T θ1ai.
− 1−ψT
T
log yi0 +
1
T
T−1X
t=1
ψt{θ1(aiT−t − ai.) + εiT−t}.
This is equation (13).
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A.2. The allocation equation
Starting from equation (12) we average over T periods
1
T
TX
t=1
ait =
1
T
TX
t=1
(λ2i − θ2 log yit−1 + ηit). (15)
The average of the lagged log income equals the initial log income and a weighted
average of the year-to-year growth rates
1
T
TX
t=1
log yit−1 =
1
T
T−1X
t=0
log yit
=
1
T
T−1X
t=0
(T − t)∆ log yit + log yi0
=
1
T
TX
t=0
(T − t)∆ log yit + log yi0.
Adding and subtracting the average growth rate (∆ log yi.) result in
1
T
TX
t=1
log yit−1 = T (1− 12
T+1
T
)∆ log yi. + log yi0 +
TX
t=0
T−t
T
(∆ log yit −∆ log yi.).
Inserting this in (15) we get equation (14).
30
